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ABSTRACT
The United States transportation system must fulfill two basic
and inter-related requirements. The first is to stimulate our eco-
nomic position through foreign trade and commerce . The second
requirement is to add to our defense posture during these times of
continuing international tension*
This oaper examines the role of the United States merchant marine
in furthering our economic and defensive interests. United States
shipping policies as implemented by legislation and the resulting
federal assistance xerograms have failed to oromote an adequate United
States merchant fleet.
The threat of proving Soviet maritime strength emphasizes ihe
need for a revision of United States policies to nrovide a merchant
marine of modern, competitive, and efficient ships.
Suggestions are made relative to improvements in policies, en-
couraging operating efficiencies, and changing federal assistance
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The ability of a nation to carry on foreign commerce and inter-
national trade is a vital determinant of its economic vitality
«
Throughout history, the most influential governments have been those
which develop their trade potentials and foster policies designed t©
improve their national position on the world market
s
u The United
States, as the leader in world trade, has an important interest in
ocean shipping which in 1963 accounted for 98 o 5 percent of all goods
moved to or from our shores • Ocean transportation holds the key to
the power of the United States to utilize its resources for
development or to mobilize for ware The importance of transportation
in the logistical application is aptly illustrated by the following
8
Transportation is the most difficult and the most important
part of logistics, far more important than the procurement
and manufacture of things. Regardless of what you require,
and regardless of how accurate your requirements estimate
is, regardless of what you procure in what quantity, or in
what quality, if you cannot transport it to the place where
it will be profitably used, it is quite worthless « [8]
The U. S, Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provides that the United States
will have a national flag merchant marine sufficient to ©arry all of
its domestic water borne commerce, and a "substantial portion" of its
HRear Admiral John Harlee, USN (Retired), Lecture, Uo So Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, April 15, 1964o

foreign trade. The general interpretation of a "substantial portion"
means 50 percent of the United States foreign trade • In addition the
U. S. Merchant Marine is to be adequate to act as the "the fourth &m.
of defense" during war.
In an effort to achieve these goals considerable assistance by
the federal government has been given to our maritime industries.
This has been due to the higher U. S. costs of operating and building
ships than that of foreign nations.
Even with substantial subsidy programs the United States Merchant
Marine has been unable to cope with foreign competition and during times
of peace the United States fleet has always carried less than half of
our foreign trade.
It is hypothesized that United States policies on subsidies to
the merchant marine have been a failure from the standpoint of main=
taining a sound industry for the economic and military preparedness
interests of the United States.
The problem of maintaining an adequate merchant marine will not
be solved easily. Compounding the problem is the fact that ocean
transportation requirements in war far exceed peace time facilities
because merchant ships are in effect instruments of war The problem
is therefore, one of providing a system adequate for national security
which means that methods must be found by which water transport capaci-
ty can be provided during peace time at levels exceeding peace time
demands. Since ocean shipping is vital to national security, federal

policy must provide for- Maintaining the ocean shipping industry in a
satisfactory condition*
This paper will examine the actions of the government in at=
tempting to promote the interests of the U« S« Merchant Marine through
legislative efforts, and their resulting government aid programs e
The emergens of the USSR as a first rate maritime nation using
its merchant marine for both political and economic advantage points
out clearly the pressing need for a revision of United States policies
in order to promote an American Merchant Marine which will be ee©~
nomically sufficient and a realistic deterrent to the USSR as a truly
effective "fourth arm of defense ."
Suggested Areas of Further Study *,
The relatively limited time available for research in preparing
this paper to fulfill the requirements of a Masters degree in Manage-
ment during a ten month period precluded the detailed study of several
important aspects of ocean transportation c
Topics which suggest further detailed study are listed belowo
1. The application of value engineering techniques to merchant
ship operations as related to both dock-side cargo handling and under=
way ship operations.
2« Formulation of a national maritime policy Unlike 193&, when
the basic policy was framed, the United States today is not self-
sufficient and must rely on ocean transportation for acquiring many

vital resources. Of prime importance is whether our merchant marine
should be accepted as a necessary cost of defense for survival due to
resource limitations An analysis of incorporating the federal regu-
latory and promotional functions in the Department of Defense seems
in order*
3« The payment for national defense features incorporated in
ships by a cost effectiveness approach should reveal the true value
of this program
c
4. An analysis of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 with particular
emphasis on the effectiveness and appropriateness of its two principal
forms of aid. the operating and construction differential subsidies
With less than half of U.S. foreign trade ships receiving operating
subsidies, a study of subsidized and non-subsidized operations on
similar routes seems appropriate.
5« The increasing adoption of mechanization and automation
raises the question as to the compatibility of terminal facilities .
both domestic and foreign, for the efficient use of these technological
advances.
6. The regulations related to essential foreign trade routes
present questions as to their appropriateness and whether the oper-
ating subsidy paid to liner ships on these routes should be extended
to bulk and tramp operations.
7» The operations and regulations of the nflags°of~convenlence,t

fleets and their impact on our economic, political, and defense
interests is an area of importance*
8o The success of our ocean transportation system presents a
tremendous challenge to the ingenuity of American management to
develop better production methods . to improve iabor^management
relations and the successful application of new technology^,

Chapter II
The Role of U, S e Ocean Transportatipn~°HistoriQal
Since the founding of our nation, the importance ©f a strong
merchant marine has been demonstrated forcibly many times Those who
first colonized and explored the country eame here in ships, and ships
were their first means of communication and trade with each other and
with other countries.
Ships helped knit America together as a united country fronting
on two oceans. They brought goods and people from the East Coast t©
the West Coast around Cape Horn, later by way of Panama, making p©ssi=
ble the rapid development of that rich area after the discovery ©f gold
in 1849.
The golden era of the Uo So Merchant Marine was ushered in with
the famous clipper ships in the 1840*
s
Until sail was replaced by
steam, the Yankee Clippers gave this country a pre-eminent position
in the maritime world. They were used principally on the long
voyages to the West Coast, India, and China, often sailing at 18 to
19 knots with favoring winds, faster than many cargo ships today
•
In war, merchant ships served first as the only American Navy 9
later as an important supplement to the regular Navy, In its early
history this country was the leader in many maritime innovations,
including the steamship. The steamship, Savannah, began the age ©f
steam powered-ships with her first crossing ©f the Atlantic Ocean

in 1819.
But after the Civil War the merchant fleet was neglected in
favor of internal transport. The time and money of investors and
explorers were being spent in building railroads and opening up the
West. Leadership in the development of the potentialities of the
steamship was left to Great Britain o England took the lead in
building iron and steel hulled vessels propelled by steam and using
the more efficient screw propellers in place of paddle wheels
Our government attempted to help merchant shipping by granting
contracts for carrying mail, or by permitting the import of ship*
building materials without tariff
s
e Nevertheless, by the beginning
of the twentieth century only one American Trans-Atlantic line was
in operation and American ships were carrying less than 10 percent
of the nation* s trade.
As in the preceding centuries, the last 50 years have brought
many occasions when the security of the nation was dependent in
large measure on the availability of a strong and active merchant
fleet. At the outbreak of World War I in Europe, most of the foreign
flag vessels, which at that time carried nearly 90 percent of Uo So
foreign trade, were suddenly withdrawn from our services Goods
piled up on our docks for lack of ships to move them, the importation
of essential materials was drastically curtailed and freight rates
soared in price o
Upon this nation's entry into World War I we were foreed to

rely to a very great extent on foreign vessels to transport the men
and materials of war abroad to the fighting fronts o A hug© and costly
shipbuilding program was begun under the stimulus of war with the
Emergency Fleet Corporation building a total of 2,318 vessels between
1918 and 1922, but very few ships came off the ways to be of any us©
before the war ended* Since these ships had been hurriedly designed
under emergency conditions many were unsulted to peace time use*
At the approach of World War II, the situation was quit© similar s
with our fleet deteriorating in size and quality , and a large part of
our goods being carried in foreign flag ships • But that time, as-
1
sisted by the long range building program resulting from the Merchant
Marin© Act of 193&, the country was able to build ships fast enough
to meet the tremendous demands of a world wide war* From 1942 through
194-5 « United States shipyards built 5»592 merchant ships of which
2,701 were Liberty ships, 414 were the faster Victory type, 651
were tankers, 417 were standard cargo types and the remaining 1,409
were military or minor types©
The government also took over the direction of ship operation
o
In February 1942, the War Shipping Administration was established for
this purpose with the head of the Maritime Commission also head of this
new agency*, Ships were taken over from private operators in both
In 1936* the Uo S« Maritime Commission laid out a long range




domestic and foreign trades, foreign ships were bought ; enemy ships
in our ports were seized «. Four-fifths of the supplies for the entire
war effort were transported by the merchant fleet under the War
Shipping Administration
c
After the war these same ships moved the supplies needed for
rehabilitation of devastated countries . Many of them were sold at
prices and under conditions set up by the Merchant Ships Sales Act
of 19^6 « When this Act expired in 1951* 1»956 ships had been sold 9
843 "to American, and 1,113 to foreign flag operators at a return of
nearly two billion dollars to the government • Surplus vessels were
laid up in reserve fleets at eight sites throughout the country for
use in future emergencies
«
Such emergencies were not long in coming • When war broke out
in Korea in 1950, all available privately owned ships were chartered
and by March 1952, over 500 reserve ships had been placed back in
service to move troops, supplies, and equipment to the theatre of
operations.
When the Suez Canal was closed in 1956» reserve fleet tankers
were withdrawn to provide the extra capacity for hauling petroleum
the long way around Africa,, Again, when war threatened in Lebanon,
The American Merchant Marine provided the support to our military
forces.
These were practical lessons in the value of an adequate

merchant marine to our country *s security « Although less dramatic, the
economic contribution is also vitally important to the nation 9 s welfare
by assuring uninterrupted movement of the agricultural, manufactured
and raw materials in the foreign commerce • We are dependent upon a
large variety of imported foods, raw materials, and other products to
maintain our high standard of living, and to supply necessary elements
of many of the exports which we send to foreign countries
.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past that we cannot
depend on other countries to supply at all times the ships needed for
the defense and trade of the United States • We must, therefore, main=
tain enough shipbuilding capacity, experienced shipping companies and
skilled workmen of our own to provide a United States Merchant Marine




American Merchant Marine Legi slation
Legislative enactments by Congress have played an important role
in determining shipping policy and aiding the American Merchant Marine
o
Following the American Revolution t legislation was generally defensive
in nature and was aimed at countering discriminatory tonnage duties to
be placed on foreign operated vessels plying the coastal trades of th©
United States • In 1808, foreign flag vessels were excluded by legis=
lation from the domestic tradeso It was also established that only
ships built in domestic shipyards were eligible to sail in the coastal
trades. With respect to foreign trade, our shipping industry flourished
with the Yankee Clippers, the envy of all other maritime nations Thus,,
little government aid was needed in this era c Other countries at this
time were not so fortunate and made direct aid to their fleets in the
form of mail subsidies
«
With the advent of metal ships and steam propulsion in the middle
of the 18th century, the United States lost its pre~eminent position
and due to higher building and operating costs , the Uo So Merchant
Marine diminished in size and economic health o Mail subsidies were
enacted to bolster our shipping lines being used from 184-7 to 188? and
The Uo So is not alone in providing domestic navigation monopoly,
as this practice had been used by France, Finland, Greece, Portugal,




from 1864 to 1877 but they proved to be of little practical benefit-.
The period from 1891 to World War I was one in which the merchant
marine needed direct assistance to meet the needs of commerce and
defense but again only ineffective mail subsidies were usedo The
primary reason for not having an effective shipping policy was that
public opinion was against the government supporting a relatively
small segment of private enterprise and a feeling that the funds
could be better used elsewhere The Ocean Mail Act of 1891 upon
which the industry depended for existence demonstrates the limited
assistance policy of the government The vague language of the Act
states that with respect to mail contracts that they "should subserve
and promote the postal and commerical interests of the United States
o
M
The imminence of the United States • entry into World War I,
coupled with the fact that 90 percent of our foreign trade was being
carried in foreign flag vessels, promoted the enactment of the Shipping
Act of 19160^ One of the main purposes of the Act was to establish a
United States Shipping Board to encourage, develop and create a
merchant marine to meet the requirements of the commerce of the
United States o Although the Act conferred upon the Board, regulatory,
promotional, and proprietary functions, the power to acquire » own and
operate ships overshadowed all other functions . Section H of the




Act grants these broad powers in the following languages
Sec e Ho That the board, if in its judgment is necessary
to carry out the purposes of this act, may form m_der the laws
of the District of Columbia one or more corporations for the
purchase, construction, equipment, lease , charter, maintenance
,
and operation of merchant vessels in the commerce of the United
States o The total capital stock shall not exceed $50,000,
The corporation formed to carry out the provisions of the Act
was the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the main function of which was to
procure the nation's wartime shipping . Emergency legislation in 1917
augmented the initial 50 million dollar working capital by an ad~
ditional 750 million for shipbuilding and ship purchasingo Before
World War I was completed, Congress had appropriated in excess of 5
billion dollars to the Corporation The chief accusations against
the wartime operations of the Board were extravagance and inefficiency
in the construction and operating programs and in the Board's failure
to include in the shipbuilding contracts termination clauses • It
should be remembered, however, that the purpose of the shipbuilding
program was, as has been so often the case, to create a large fleet
in the shortest possible time
Among other important features of the Shipping Act of 1916, much
of United States policy with respect to shipping conferences in es-





The United States government accepts conferences but it puts
restrictions on their American members which other important maritime
nations (which accept cartels with little official aixlmosity) do not
United States flag ship operators may join conferences but are pro-
hibited by the Shipping Act of 1916 from engaging in such discrimi-
natory practices as granting of deferred rebates , retaliatory practices
to secure ocean trade, and making unfair contracts with any shipper
based on the volume of freight offered
The 1916 Act (Section l*!-a) also provides means of disciplining
foreign lines participating in steamship conferences affecting United
States foreign trade If they use deferred rebate schemes or other
"unfair practices" they can be refused entry to American pertso The
same penalty can be invoked if a conference excludes United States
flag lines from joining an organization on equal terms with other
members. In this way, conferences can be kept open to new members,
thus overcoming one of the objections to a cartel type organization©
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 had as its purpose to provide
for the promotion and maintenance of the American Merchant Marine
,
to repeal certain emergency legislation enacted during World War I
and to provide for the disposition, regulation and use of war built
vessels. More importantly, the 1920 Act embodied the first definitive




statement of government policy under which aid could be given \he
American Merchant Marine » [7]
It stated:
That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper
growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most
suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater part of
its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time
of war or national emergencyoooand it is hereby declared t© be
the policy oi the United States to do whatever may be necessary
to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant
marine 000
A construction loan fund of 125 million dollars was established
by the 1920 Act but this did little to stimulate shipbuilding, as not
a single ship was constructed in the United States between 1922 and
1928 for transoceanic service • Although this particular program was
not effective, it set the stage for later government participation
in shipbuilding activities • The surplus of war built ships, which
the government was unable to sell, offset all measures to build up
the peace time fleet and the result was low shipping rates and a
generally depressed industry
«
The next major piece of merchant marine legislation was the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which was another attempt to solve the
5problems created by the excess Vtorld War I fleet c Despite its




provision for doubling the size of the 1920 construction loan fund
to 250 million dollars (which was to remain a revolving fund) only
31 new ships were built while this Act was in force
o
While the 1928 Act was a substantial improvement over earlier
legislation it had several serious defects which were summarized in
the 1950 Magnuson Committee Report as follows §
First, the compensation granted American lines was not based upon
actual conditions encountered on the particular rout© served e so
that some lines got more than they needed , while others competing
with subsidized foreign companies were given to© little aido
Second, the ships replacement provisions were somewhat to© laxly
enforced.. Third, loans for shipbuilding were needed at varying
rates , so that lucky lines got money at almost nominal interest
charges, while others paid several times as much, creating an
element of unfairness. This, however, was not due to favoritism
but to legal interpretation of a carelessly worded section of
the act. Fourth, there was inadequate supervision over the use
to which subsidy money was put by the lines, officers of one or
two companies paying themselves huge bonuses and dividends when
their companies were almost going bankrupt • Fifth, there was
complaint that in violation of law, contracts were so worded
that public bidding was frustrated and only a predetermined
line could comply,
*
Often called the "Magna Carta" of the American Merchant Marine %
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, is the basis for much of the aid pro-
vided to the maritime industry today o
The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, states?
To further the development and maintenance of an adequate and
well balanced American Merchant Marine, to promote the commerce
United States Congress, Senate Merchant, Marine Study and Invest!-




of the United States, to aid in the national defense, to repeal
certain former legislation, and for other purposes 7
In order to administer the provisions of the Act, a new federal
regulatory agency, the U S Maritime Commission was ©reatedo The
Commission was to carry out the provisions of the Act through the
following measures:
lo Administering construction differential subsidies for vessels
built in Uo S« shipyards for use on essential foreign trade routes
2. Administering operating differential subsidies for vessels
used on essential foreign trade routes
3o Financial aid in the construction of vessels by granting loans
at low interest rates
»
4. Allowing credit for tum~in of obsolete vessels to be applied
to the purchase price of new vessels s
5. Payment for national defense features incorporated in ships e
6. Establishment of reserve funds with income tax benefits to
vessel operators (deferred taxes).
7. Guarantee of ship mortgages
•
8. Training of citizens to serve on American merchant ships u
9» Determining minimum manning, wage scales,' and working eon*
ditions for ships receiving operating differential subsidies
'Public Law No. 835, 74th Congress, approved June 29, 1936c
17

10. Authority to purchase or requisition vessels for national
security purposes
•
The long range program provided for in the 1936 Act had hardly
been put into effect when World War II intervened and the United
States embarked on a mammoth shipbuilding program that produced 5 §500
merchant ships This war built fleet superimposed on and altered the
long run program commenced under the 1936 Acto The Merchant Ships
Sales Act, passed by Congress in 19**6, directed the Maritime Com-
mission as to procedures and prices for disposal of this government
owned fleet© The sale of these vessels after World War II had the
short run effect of providing the American Merchant Marine with a
nearly adequate number of cargo ships to carry out the initial ©b=
jectives of the 1936 Acto Unfortunately^ these mass produced ships
would not prove to be economically competitive in the world market
due to limited speed and other exigency of design characteristics
o
At the same time, the availability of this tonnage acted as a de=>
terrent to a modern shipbuilding replacement program thereby setting
the stage for the block obsolescence of the U S u merchant fleet
which is a major problem today
»
In 1952, Congress passed the Long Range Shipping Act which
attacks the problem of ship obsolescence by modifying certain
features of the 1936 Acto The new law of 1952 permits the payment
of construction differential subsidies to all ships operating in the
18

foreign trade of the United States eliminating the necessity ©f the
company being engaged in subsidized operations The 195© law also
amends the 1936 Act in providing for non recourse loans on passenger
ships of not less than 10,000 tons or 18 knot speeds Under the
former provisions, a shipowner who owns a ship built with a govern-
ment subsidy obligated himself to pay not only ©n the particular ship
herself but also on the value of the rest of his fleet « Thus, the
loss of a major passenger ship which might represent as much as 80$
of the company1 s net worth would not financially jeopardize the re=
maining company 8 s operations*)
Under the 1936 Act, the Maritime Commission could purchase a
vessel seventeen or more years old if that ship were to be replaced
by a new vessel* The 1952 law reduces the trade in age to 12 years
and also broadens the availability of construction reserve funds for
reconstruction or reconditioning of vessels • One final feature of
the 1952 Law is the elimination of the 25,000 dollar per year ceiling
pay for employees of subsidized steamship companies
A 1958 amendment to the 1936 Act has proved to be of special im-
portance Prior to this time, government insurance was available
for ships* mortgages and short term loans as an incentive to private
investment in ship construction; but funds available in the Federal
Ship Mortgage Fund were dependent upon Congressional appropriations
o
Now funds may be borrowed from the treasury to pay this insurance if
the Mortgage Fund is found insufficiento This and an earlier 1956
19

provision providing for 100$ insurance of principle and interest
rather than the old 90$, have been major legislative enactments for
the benefit of the merchant marine • This procedure also favors the
use of private rather than government loans and reduces the role ©f
the government as a supporter and finance agent of private business
„
This listing of the various legislative enactments throughout the
years, indicates the heavy reliance that has been placed on direct
government aid, particularly subsidies, in supporting our merchant
marine • It is undoubtedly true that without such aid our maritime
fleet would be in a much more precarious position today if existing
at all o In order to make a valued judgment as to where our policies
and legislation have been wanting and what specific courses of action
are required, it is necessary to examine the functions of that govern^
ment agency primarily responsible for promoting our merchant marine—






The Maritime Administration was established by Reorganization
Plan 21 of 1950, as one of the successor agencies to the former
United States Maritime Commissione It is headed by a Maritime
Administrator, who is appointed by the Presidents by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate and acts under authorities dele-
gated by the Secretary of Commerce
*
The Maritime Administration is responsible for administering
programs authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended^
and related shipping statutes, to aid in the development, promotion,
and operation of an American Merchant Marine adequate to carry the
nation's domestic waterbome commerce and a substantial portion of
its foreign commerce during peace time, and capable of serving as a
naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergencies a
In carrying out its functions, the Administration is guided by the
Declaration of Policy contained in Title I of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, as amended.
Under Reorganization Plan 7» of 1961 , a Maritime Subsidy Board
was established with the functions of the former Federal Maritime
Board with respect to subsidization of the American Merchant Marine
being transferred to the Secretary of Commereco The Secretary, in
turn established within the Maritime Administration a Maritime Subsidy
21

Board and delegated to it the authority t© award, amend v and terminate
contracts for ships construction and ship operating differential sub=>
sidies. These subsidies are granted to Uo S u citizens t@ meet disparity
between United States and foreign costs in these respective areas* In
this connection, the Maritime Subsidy Board investigates and detemines
the relative costs of constructing ships in the United States and in
foreign countries, and of operating ships under United States and com-
petitive foreign flags and takes other actions necessary to the award
of subsidies
o
Other government aids to shipping are provided by the Maritime
Administration by insuring mortgages and /or1 loans made by private
lending institutions to finance the construction, reconstruction, and
reconditioning of ships; acquires old ships in exchange for m©re modern
ships or for allowances of credit on the construction of new ships.
It also recommends to the Department of the Navy 9 the payment ©f the
cost of national defense features added to ships
The Administration investigates and determines ocean services
,
routes, and lines essential for the development and maintenance of
U« S. foreign commerce and the type, size, speed 8 and other require-
ments of ships to provide adequate service on these routes There is
a requirement that the operators who are awarded operating differential
subsidies maintain regular service on these routes
o
An area which promises hope of making the American Merchant
22

Marine more competitive by reducing operating costs is that ©f re-
search and developments The Maritime Administration is ©barged "with
research and development in the maritime field, including cargo
handling, development and utilization of new ship designs, marine
transportation systems, advanced propulsion concepts, and ship
management techniques • The major objectives of this program are
the adoption of new and improved scientific and technical advances v
thereby providing a strong U So maritime industry capable of com-
peting in the world market with a minimum of government supports
It is unfortunate that more emphasis is not given jthls_important
area . For example, in 1963. the Maritime Administration with a net
operating cost of current operations totalling, nearly ^75 million
dollars was able to allocate only 60 9, millions to research and de-
velopment activities 9 With less than lo5 percent of current operating
costs in research and development, it is not surprising that the
Administration reported, "No major breakthroughs (in R&D) ar® pre-
dicted*" [2]
An accelerated mechanized ship development program previously
planned to start during 1963, by the Administration e was deferred
due to budgetary limitations,,
Recent R&D efforts have included successful high speed (6(
operation of the world* s first ocean going hydrofoil ship, the 95




service were deferr Indefinitely of an <
program. Research is currently being n the field*, of
shir motions, propulsion, structures, and controls; development of
a prototype shir* radar data computer to aid in avoiding collisions;
and studies of integrated ship propulsion plants . These and related
efforts vigorously prosecuted could do much to achieve efficient oper-
ations and reduce the competitive gat) Kith foreign shipping!
Research and development i-jork has started to pay dividends in
that during late I963 and early 1964, five of the fifteen subsidized
U. S. steamship lines ordered ?? automated ships for a total cost of
about 300 million dollarso The cost saving advantage to the ouerators
of these shios will be substantial Due to drastic innovations in
cargo handling equipment and electronic engine room operations,
savings of approximately 15^ of the normal at sea cost of $4000 a
day for conventional ships should be realized* Most of the saving
will result from lower labor costs as the crews of the automated ships
can be reduced about one third, from 50 to 3^«
It is also noteworthy that despite notoriously poor labor re-
lations in the maritime industries, agreements already have been
reached by the ship operators with two of the major seafaring unions to
authorize this reduced manning level
This breakthrough to automation is largely credited to actions
of the Maritime Subsidy Board of the Maritime Administration which
?4

advised subsidized operators in August of 1963s, that to qualify for
continued payment of operating subsidies any new ships must have
centralized engine room control, a simplified power plant, and direct
bridge control of the main engine • [l^j
While this U« S e move toward automation is encouraging v it does
not mean that all of our problems have been solved e Foreign lines have
also turned to automation to reduce costs The Japanese, Germans,, and
Norweigians have also launched highly automated ships
To carry out the national maritime policy , the Maritime Adminis-
tration, with the approval of the President, constructs and reconditions
ships for the governments These ships may be sold (at favorable prices
to the Uo S e buyer), chartered to private operators, or used for govern^
ment operations The Administration charters government owned ships
to U. So operators when such charters promote the national maritime
policy . During national emergencies it may requisition for charter
or operation ships owned by D» S citizens y This provision also applies
to the large fleet of ships owned by U So citizens and operated under
the so-called "flags of convenience" of Panama, Liberia, and Honduras
(PANLIBHON)o The number of ships operating under these flags is
approximately one-half of our U So manned and operated fleet of 920
active ships o Many of these ships are new y fast, and modem in design
,
They operate competitively and without subsidy, primarily because ship-
owners are not required to pay Uo So wage scales when operating under
25

foreicn flags*, Increasing pressures, both domestic (e.go, labor unions
and subsidized U So operators) and foreipn, may make it economically
impracticable for United States shipowners to continue oneration under
PanLibHon flags 9 Loss of these ships to effective United States
shipping control could be a serious blox* in an emergency situation*
Other functions of the Maritime Administration are maintenance
of a reserve fleet, maritime training, and National Shipping Authority
responsibilities o Each of these will be discussed briefly below.
National Defense Reserve Fleet* Government owned ships in excess
of active shipping requirements as determined jointly by the Department
of Defense and the Maritime Administration are maintained in the
national defense reserve fleet * At the end of I963, there were 1,819
ships at the eight reserve fleet locations . Of the total number, 97^
have been designated as priority ships for national defense but funds
appropriated in 19&3 oermitted only 67$ completion of preservation
work due at a cost of 139 million dollars* £>]
Maritime Training * Training activities consist of operation of
the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, and
radar observer training program for seagoing personnel conducted at
New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco A grant-in-aid program is
administered to the four states currently operating maritime nautical
schools




The Merchant Marine Academy and the four state schools annually gradu*
ate a total of nearly 400 who receive licenses as Uc So Merchant
Officers and (if qualified) Ensign commissions in the Uo So Naval
Reserve The cost in 1963 for training activities was nearly five
million dollars
•
National Ship-oinfy Authority The Maritime Administration is also
vested with the powers of the Director, National Shipping Authority
which is the counterpart of the War Shipping Administration of World
War Ho Short of all-out war, its purpose is to provide ships from the
reserve fleet to meet government requirements which exceed private
shipping capabilities. In an emergency situation, the NSA would not
only provide ships from the idle fleet, but would also requisition
privately owned ships as needed
•
Having examined the various responsibilities and activities of our
merchant marine's promotional agency , the Maritime Administration, it is
now appropriate to analyze the specific federal assistance programs t©






One of the most important forms ©f aid provided to the Uo So
Merchant Marine is the operating differential subsidy which was
authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Title VI )„ The
term simply means the government will pay the difference between the
cost of operating a U u S vossei and the cost ©f operating the same
type of vessel in the same service under competitive foreign flags
•
The subsidy may be paid only to an operator who agrees to provide
service on a route which has been determined by the Maritime Adn&nis-
tration to be essential to the foreign trade and commerce of the United
States • The requirements of United States trade and defense are under
constant review to determine which areas need regular American shipping
service, and how many and what kinds of American ships are needed to
provide that service In 19&3 » t^ie Maritime Administration reviewed
the essentiality and Uo So flag service requirements of five U S
foreign trade routes At the present time there are a total of Jk
routes declared t© be essential, plus round-the-world east-bound and
west-bound services and a tri-eontinent service which includes parts
of several trade routes These routes include groups of ports on the
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific e@asts and routes numbers 32 » 33$ and 3^
add a "fourth coastline 9 M to the Great Lakes
Subsidy payments are made for the difference in costs of wages,
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subsistence of officers and crews, insurance, and r _>•
repair o No subsidy is yjaid for cargo handling e renin
fuel, passenger food, foreign nurchases 9 or administrative c©s1
American wages paid to seagoing personnel are three to four
times those paid to their counterparts on foreign flag shins o (See
Table I ) and these costs comprise nearly three-quarters of the
operating subsidy payment
s
The high pay received by the seamen
puts them in the upper scale of American labora The average monthly
wage of an able»bodied seaman on a typical United States flag C-?.
ship is over $700 o This includes overtime and employer contributions
to funds but does not include payroll taxes, subsistence and lodging
^
transportation and accident insurance© There is apparently some
justification in the argument that high wage costs are driving ships
away from the American flag, and although a useful pool exists for
emergency manning of ships, there are today over twice as many seamen
on union rolls as there are seagoing jobs available
«
The amount of subsidy due an operator is carefully calculated,.
The cost of each subsidizable item is computed, by the operator for
each voyage and is checked by government accountants Information is
obtained on the cost of parallel items of expense incurred by foreign
companies operating similar ships on the same trade routes,, The Uo So
and foreign costs are compared to obtain the difference in percent




AVERAGE DAILY OPERATING COSTS OF C-2 TYPE SKIPS




Stores, Supplies and Equipment 100




Fuel - Steaming 609
Fuel - in port 120













competition of each principal foreign flag on the particular route c
Negative differentials are applied as en offset against positive
differentials to arrive at a composite weighted differential subsidy
rate for each item
The operator who receives a subsidy must agree to accept certain
conditions, restrictions, and limitations
s
a« He must provide a regular service with a stated minimum and
maximum number of sailings each year©
bo He must man his ships with United States citizens a
c» His ships must be operated in the most economical and efficient
manner*
do He must replace his vessels as they become obsolete with ships
built in American shipyards, and for this purpose must set up special
funds
•
e e He must outfit and supply his ships with materials produced
in the United States and repair his ships in the Uo So 9 except in an
emergencyo
f • He must limit the payment of profits or dividends to not in
excess of 10$ of his "capital necessarily employed /• and then only to
the extent earned, and must observe other restrictions on dividend
payments
o
go He must retain earned profits in excess of 10$ for a 10 year
accounting period • At the end of the period, he must repay to the
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government half of all the profits in excess of 10$ , up to the full
amount of the subsidy received c
ho Except with special permission of the government, he may not
operate in the domestic serviee y nor operate unsubsidized vessels in
competition with other subsidized lines, nor act as agent or broker
for or operate foreign flag vessels competing with Uo So flag vessels
in essential services, nor carry on business unrelated to shipping
.
i A subsidized operator may not include more than $25,000 in
salary for any official or employee of the company as a business expense
in the computation of earnings for recapture and Reserve Fund deposit
purposeso He must file financial statements and reports with the
government and submit his records to audit and examination whenever
required o [ll|
The cost of operating differential subsidies to the government
for the 13 year period ending in 1959* was about $78 million annually
This net subsidy was approximately 2*$ of the $4 2 billion direct cost
of operating the ships of the subsidized operators
•
Of 920 United States flag ships in active service as of June 30,
I963, a total of 6l6 were engaged in foreign trade and of these, 315
»
or slightly more than half, were subsidized • A summary of the 15
operating-differential subsidy contracts in effect June 30, 19&3*
covering these 315 ships is shown in Table XI
«
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Source: United States Department of Commerce, Maritime ^mini stration
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Merchant Marine Act of 193 f-\ is the other principal type of government
aid provided the merchant marine This subsidy may be paid to any
American-flag owner who builds a ship in a Uo So shipyard to be used
in the foreign trade of the United States o The law provides that the
subsidy paid shall not be in excess of 50$ of the domestic con-
struction costs, exclusive of national defense features
•
KLibibility for construction subsidy is based upon certain con-
ditions being met 9 these include;
a The proposed ship will be operated in foreign commerce against
flag competition
o
bo The proposed plans for the ship must meet certain standards
of design with respect to safety and operating efficiencieso
Co The applicant must possess the required financial and operating
ability attendant with tL So foreign trade operations
»
do Congress must have appropriated sufficient funds to cover the
cost to be borne by the government
e e The ships must be readily adaptable for use as a naval axix~
iliary
An American-flag owner who wishes to build a ship with construction
subsidy aid must submit detailed plans to the Maritime Administration
These plans are checked for adequacy in writing the requirements of
the service intended and that they are up to government standard
s
Q The
plans are also submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, who may request
3^

inclusion of certain features considered necessary for national defense.
United States shipyards are then invited to submit bids for the
construction of the ship. These bids are carefully evaluated by the
government and the prospective owner to determine the most responsible
bidder and most responsive bid. Formerly, West Coast shipyards were
given a six percent differential in their favor on bids for ships to
be built for a West Coast operator. In 19&3 however, Public Law
87-877 repealed this provision and all bids, irrespective of source,
are considered equally. The government may however, still award the
contract to other than the low bidder when considered necessary for
purposes of national defense.
The government then determines the cost of constructing the pro-
posed ship in a foreign shipyard. This involves the selection of a
foreign shipbuilding center, taking into account the personnel, facili-
ties, and experience necessary for constructing the proposed ship and
the contract requirements of time, quality, and price • The estimated
cost of constructing the commercial ship (excluding any national de-
fense features) at the foreign yard is computed, including costs of
materials, equipment and components, direct labor, overhead, es-
tablishment and social charges, profit and escalation,.
The difference between the construction cost of the successful
U. S. bidder and the estimated foreign cost is the subsidy rate u In
I963, the maximum subsidy rate of some passenger ships was increased
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to 60$ and to $% for the construction of other new ships and recon-
struction of ships. The former maximum subsidy rate was 50$ of the
domestic cost.
Two methods of paying the construction subsidy are in effect.
Under the first method, the government contracts exclusively with an
pays the full contract price to the building yard and then sells the
ship to the operator at the estimated foreign cost (less the cost of
any national defense features). Under the other method, the operator
and the government jointly contract with the builder, with the govern-
ment paying the builder the sum of the subsidy and national defense
features costs, with the operator paying the remainder of the con-
struction costs.
The Merchant Marine Act of 193&, forbids the payment of operating
subsidies on ships over the statutory age (20 to 25 years) • Thus,
a subsidized operator who wishes to continue receiving operating sub-
sidy payments must agree to replace his ships as they become overage.
This is the principal stimulus to the shipbuilding replacement program.
In 1955 > it was determined that 84$ of the U. S. private fleet in
foreign trade and almost all of the reserve fleet ships would reach
the 20 year age by 1965* Th* s threatening "block obsolescence" and
the need for replacing the fleet with fast and efficient ships, prompted
the Maritime Administration to give special emphasis to stimulating
shipbuilding replacement programs. Between 1955 and I960, new
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contracts were executed with 13 subsidized operators for the replacement
of 299 ships by 1975, at a total cost of over 4.5 billion dollars • Al-
though a step in the right direction, this program has not been entirely
effective as orders for new ships have not kept pace with deliveries.
For example, the total number of merchant ships under construction in
the U. S. shipyards has steadily declined since 1959, with a decrease
from 64 as of July 1962, to 54 in June of 1963. [2] The United States
ranked a poor fifth on a world basis in deliveries of new merchant
ships for her own registry in the fiscal year ending June 30, I963.
Table III presents comparative data of ship deliveries during this
period.
The powerful influence of the construction differential subsidy
and the higher costs of building ships in the United States are clearly
demonstrated in these statistics. U. S. shipyards produced only ships
built for American registry. Higher U. S. construction costs have made
our yards non-competitive for building of ships for other countries.
Japan, on the other hand, built a. total of 52 ships, grossing over one
million deadweight tons for other countries. It is also significant
that no ships were constructed in foreign yards for U. S. registry.
This fact demonstrates the effect that the subsidy program has on
maintaining the U. S. shipbuilding industry. The cost of construction
differential subsidies payed or payable during the fiscal year ending




DELIVERIES OF NEW MERCHANT SHIPS DURING FY ENDING JUNE 30, I963
Registry for
which built Ranking Number Deadweight Tons (1000® s)
United States (6) 29 476
United Kingdom (1) 94 1,183
Sweden (5) 29 483
Netherlands (7) 29 426
Norway (2) 95 1,979
Denmark (10) 21 210
France cm 15 190
Italy (9) 14 372
Japan (3) 98 1,669
West Germany (8) 31 399
Liberia (4) 27 1,005




























Source: Department of Commerce . Maritime Admini stration
38

without this construction aid, our domestic shipbuilding industry
would be reduced to insignificance and that federally owned shipyards
would be our only viable activities for ship production*
This is the argument of those who maintain that our shipyards
must be kept active, even as a captive industry, so that we will not
be caught without adequate construction facilities in &n emergency
build-up period
o
Have subsidy programs been effective in their application as
envisioned by the Merchant Marine Act of 193&? The answer must be an
emphatic NO. The United States policies on subsidies to the merchant
marine have been a failure from the standpoint of maintaining a sound
and thriving industry. The provisions of the 1936 Act for replacement
of current tonnage are inadequate. This inadequacy has been recognized
for some time and increasing attention is being given to a complete
overhauling of the 1936 Act. [7] The provisions of the Act have been
the subject of general criticism. An article in a leading financial
weekly stated:
The Merchant Marine Act, even as its staunchest advocates now
concede, has failed its purpose. After 25 years, like most
ships, it is hopelessly obsolete. Surely the time has come to
replace it with something better. [12]
The subsidy system offers little incentive toward self-sufficiency
on the part of the shipping industry and has cost the United States
taxpayer an average of 150 million dollars per year since 195^«
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The present admini stration of the subsidy system is en obstacle
to the progress of the American Merchant Marine* Military requirements
demand high speed capabilities and special defense features which are
not wholly consistent with commerical interests of economy in admin-
istering construction subsidies. Many espouse the view that the
subsidies presently create inconsistent aims for labor, business,
and government in the maritime industry. The operator is encouraged
to over-specify his construction needs, knowing that half the cost
will be paid by the government,, By the same token, the operator
over-emphasizes economy in unsubsidized operating costs and cares
little about subsidized costs
•
Other forms of government aid to the merchant marine include
payment for national defense features incorporated in new ships,
government insurance of ship construction loans and mortgages, trade-
in allowances on obsolete ships, certain tax benefits and cargo pre-
ference regulations.
The plans and specifications for ships built with government
aid must be submitted to the Department of the Navy for review and
approval. If any additional national defense features are included
as a result of this review, their cost is borne by the government.
Examples of national defense features would be additional heavy
lift capacity, roLl-on« roll-off capacity for quick loading of wheeled
and tracked vehicles, increased evaporator capacities for troop
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consumption! and increased speed requirements*, The cost of these
features is relatively small in comparison to the added value obtained
in event of war or emergency. In 19^3* the cost of national defense
features was one and a quarter million dollars.
Under the early provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 193&,
as amended, the government was active in directly insuring construction
loans and ship mortgages. However, in 195^- and 1956, the law was amended
to encourage the use of private funds for financing ship construction
.
At the present time, the government insures private loans up to 75i>
of the construction value. For completed ships, the government may
insure a mortgage up to &7%$ of the actual construction costo Both
the borrower and the lender must be U. S. citizens. Here is another
illustration of the governments efforts to promote the American
economy.
Provision is made in the shipping laws for an operator to trade
in to the government an obsolete vessel in exchange for an allowance
of credit on the purchase price of a new ship. The ship traded in is
placed in the reserve fleet and since it usually is of a better type
than the war-built Liberty ships which still make up most of this
reserve fleet, both the quality of the reserve fleet and the active
fleet are improved.
Operating subsidies require the operators to maintain a Capital
Reserve Fund for new ships in which is deposited money representing
kl

the depreciation of subsidized fleets • A Special Reserve Fund in
which profits in excess of 10$ are deposited, is also required for
meeting possible future losses or financing new constructions Neither
of these mandatory funds are subject to current income taxes and are
tax exempt if used for certain purposes, such as new construction
payment of subsidy recapture to the government, and meeting operating
losses on subsidized operations* These funds have proved of greatest
benefit in covering ship replacement costs and have a similarity to
the depreciation of facilities and capital improvements of industry
in general
•
At least half of U. S e government cargoes must be transported in
U. S. flag ships. In addition, all U. S. exports purchased with
government loans must be carried in U. S» flag vessels unless a
waiver is obtained under special circumstances* Commercial trans-
actions are not affected under this ruling and traffic subject to
cargo preference comprises a small portion of total Uo So foreign
commerce—about 10$ of our exports and less than 7$ of our imports
•
Despite these small percentages, the cargo preference laws have been
important to U. S. flag ships. For example, during the period 1955-
57 * government financed programs provided 20$ of all the cargoes
carried by U. S» flag lines, and 6l$ of all outbound cargo carried




by U. S. flag tramps. Without cargo preference, U S« tramp ship:
be put out of business and American lines would lose a substantial share
of their business. As government foreign-aid programs decrease with
the increasing prosperity of aid recipients, the total cargoes decrease*
The total share of U„ S. commerce carried by foreign-flag lines has
steadily increased since the end of World War II, from about 34$ in
1946 to about 88$ in 1958.
How effective then have these various federal aid programs been
in maintaining and stimulating the growth of our merchant marine?
Questions which need to be answered include—Is our merchant marine
basically capable of serving the economic interest of the United States
and capable of function as a naval auxiliary in times of emergency as
envisioned in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936? The answer to these
questions must be in the negative. From a standpoint of size, we lead
the world in numbers and tons of shipping ONLY when the inactive fleet
of 1,74-5 over-aged and uneconomical ships are considered,. Our active
fleet consists of only 920 ships with 6l6 engaged in foreign trade,
which places us a poor fifth behind the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan,
and the USSR, in that order.
Table IV presents a comparison of the employment of Uo S flag
merchant ships over 1,000 gross tons as of June 30, 1963, snd June 30,
i960. In this three year period, the number of ships in foreign trade




EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FLAG MERCHANT SHIPS
(OCEAN-GOING SKIPS OF AT LEAST 1,000 GROSS TONS)
June 30. 196? June 30. I960 Change
Total Ships 2,665 2,93^ (269)
Active Ships 920 951 ( 3D
U. S. Foreign Trade 616 571 ( 55)
Maritime Administration 15 33 ( 18)
Privately Owned 601 536 65
U. S« Domestic Trade 299 372 ( 73)
Maritime Administration 3 3
Privately Owned 296 3^9 ( 73)
Inactive Ships 1,7^5 1,963 (23&)
Temporarily Inactive «9 99 ( 10)
Maritime Administration 8 2 1
Privately Owned 81 97 ( 16)
Maritime Reserve Fleet 1,656 1,884 (228)
Source: Annual Report of the Maritime Administration . 12^1<-
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challenge of our world shipping competitors . Table V presents data
on selected merchant fleets of the world as of June 30» 1963 * which
highlights the poor relative position of the United States,
From another aspect, despite significant increases in United
States commercial foreign trade since 1950, there has been a drop in
percentage of these cargoes carried by American flag ships (See Table
VI). Again, it is clear that our merchant marine is not carrying a
significant portion of our world trade, and government aid through
aid subsidies and other forms, have not been effective in alleviating
this imbalance,
"What of our major adversary, the USSR, and her activities with
respect to maintaining and supporting the growth of a merchant fleet
for economic and political advantage? This challenge is the subject
of the following chapter.

TAELE V
SELECTED MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD





































WATER-BORNE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
PERCENT CARRIED BY Uo S, FLAG SHIPS










1935 81 31.7 38 41,6 43 22,9
1940 106 28.7 45 38.3 61 21.2
1945 101 68,4 39 79-7 62 61.2
1950 159 39.3 97 43.7 63 32.5
1952 210 3^.3 107 38.8 103 29«5
1953 200 29.0 119 32»3 81 24.1
1954 199 27»5 121 30.1 78 23*5
1955 254 23.5 141 26.5 113 19o6
1956 306 21,9 160 24.8 145 19*9
1957 338 18.8 172 20.1 166 17.5
1958 290 13-5 176 11.7 115 16.3
1959 308 12.0 200 9*6 108 16.4
I960 323 12.3 199 9*9 124 I6.3
1961 316 10.6 188 8.1 128 14.4
1962 345 11.0 211 8.7 134 14.6




The Soviet Merchant Marine Threat
The Soviet Union already possesses a strong navy and is recognized
as being second only to the United States in naval strength » It
currently is engaged in sn enormous merchant ship construction program
which is planned to double the size of its i960 fleet by 1965, triple
it by 1970, and achieve a five to six times increase by 1980, .. It is
all too evident, then, that the Soviet Union recognizes the importance
of the sea, and sea power in all its many facets, figures prominently
in its political plans to dominate the world,
Comparitive statistical data shows that the Russian merchant fleet
has been undergoing sustained growth since 1950* while the U, S, merchant
fleet has contracted steadily since 1946, As to the future, the USSR
shows evidence of assigning high priority to its ambitious fleet ex-
pansion program, in contrast to relative neglect of the merchant fleet
in this country.
In 1939 » Russia's 1,5 million tons of merchant shipping not only
was insignificant in world standing, but also consisted predominately
of ships of ancient vintage. In contrast, United States with 11 .
6
million tons of merchant shipping ranked second to only Great Britain,
Except for a brief increase in 1955* the U, S, merchant fleet has
undergone a steady reduction since 1948, This downward slide is ex-
pected to continue unchecked unless strong remedial steps are taken to
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r>roraote the .American Merchant Marineo A partial solution has been for
the government to provide financial assistance to American flag com-
petitors* At present , only 15 American steamship lines receive oper^
ating differential subsidies •which permit them to operate on an equal
cost footing with their foreign eoaroetitorso
The build-up of the Russian fleet which commenced in 195^, showed
a net annual increase of over 440,000 dead weight tons during a six
year period • Contrastingly, the American merchant fleet suffered a
decrease in construction averaging over 30° « 000 tons per year during
the same period • See Table VII for a comparison of US/USSR tonnage
from 1939 projected through 1980 a
The upsurge in Russian tonnage in 1962, is due to the fact that
Russia is now benefiting from its 7 year construction plan (1959*1965)
o
This plan adopted in 1958, superseded a more modest 5 year plan which
was programmed for the years 1955=1960 The prescribed goal of the ?
year plan calls for doubling of the i960 fleet by 1965* The 2?nd
Communist Party Congress, which met in Moscow in late 1961, has al-
ready developed new target goals which will cover the periods 1965-70,
and 1970-1980o In 1963, Russia had over 3 million deadlight teas
building or on order,all to be delivered by 1965,and appeared to be
fulfilling the requirements of their 7 year plan of increasing at the
annual rate of 1 million dead weight tons This Russian ship con-










No of Active Shios=DWT(100C«s)
1939 (Sept) 354 1,598 1,379 11,682
1946 (Jan) 488 1,852 4,861 50,389
3 950 432 1,797 1,099 13,340
1955 684 2,426 1,072 13,602
I960 873 4,939 954 13,345
1962 1,002 5,992 843 12,810
1965 1,746 9,878 799 11,795
1970 2,619 14,817 644 10,245
1975 3,492 20,990 567 8,695
1980 4,365 27,165 489 7,145
Russian fleet expansion in period 1960-1980 projected in accordance
with tonnage goals set by 22nd Communist Party Congress • Trend toward
larger size ships undoubtedly will enable tonnage goals to be met with
fewer ships than numbers listed »
2U« S. fleet contraction projected at same rate as 1954«1960«
Source: Maritime Administration s Marine Engineering/Log
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Table VIII* Russia had five times as many ships building ?s the U„ S*
In terms of tonnage, Russia exceeded that of the U* S. by four times.
It is obvious that Russia wants to increase the size of her
merchant fleet as rapidly as possible*, Its own yards are believed to
be heavily engaged in naval construction* so to achieve the ship-
building goals of the 7 year plan, Russia is relying heavily on her
satellite shipyards and has also contracted for large amounts of tonnrcre
from free world sources » In one single contract placed in Japan in 196°,
she ordered $100 million in ships.
Despite the significant increase in Soviet merchant marine strength,
there is little evidence of concern on the part of United States officials
and the U. S. public in diminishing our gap with Russia in this important
area. It must be recognized that a strong modern American Merchant Marine
is essential to our defensive posture in times of national emergency and
to ensure our access to free world markets and vital raw materials in
time of peace.
In times of national emergency, as shown by the two World Wars and
the Korean conflict, we must rely most heavily on our own shipping
o
Being the dominant leader in world trade—accounting in 1961 for 18$
of the world's total export movement, it is only sensible that we pro-
tect our trading position by maintaining a merchant marine of sufficient
size and capabilities to maintain that position*


















Passenger Cargo 100,000 23,370
Tankers 76 1,963,400 7 242,750
Cargo 110 728,100 36 430,276
Other types
_£_ 240.600 1 1.264
TOTALS 236 3,032,100 47 697,660
Source: Maritime Admini stration : Marine Engineering /Lo
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inaction to the important wartime and peacetime roles of the merchant
marine has resulted in its steady diminution since the mass ship-
building of World War II. Compounding the problem is the fact that
the American Merchant Marine being predominantly a World War II built
fleet, is rapidly approaching the end of its economic life in block
obsolescence.
Recognition of the deterioration of the U. S. merchant fleet and
the rapid build-up of the Russian fleet has been given only by U. So
Naval officials and a few congressional supporters.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Kenneth E.
BelAeu, stated in 1962:
The Communist expansionists have come to a turning point • There
is no easy way to expand their influence much further without use
of the seas...At last, our opponent must come out of his land mass
and face us in our own element. The struggle will take place at
sea. The peaceful looking Soviet block merchant ships as an instru-
ment of decisive military, political, or economic importance now
looms large and lethal. Our merchant marine is not prepared to
meet the challenge, and worse, it gives little signs of improving. [l^J„
In a detailed study to determine whether this country 1 s sea trans-
portation requirements could be filled in time of war, Vice Admiral
John Sylvester, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, made the
following conclusions and recommendations
j
The strategic objectives of the United States in wartime, dictate
that the United States have under its control sufficient active
merchant-type shipping to promptly meet its sea lift requirements.
Previous evaluations of shipping requirements and availabilities
have shown that the United States does not have sufficient active
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merchant shipping to meet national security needs for general
war 9 even when we combine the totel of U» S. flag and U S*
controlled foreign shipping
«
The vast proportion of U« So fleg merchant tonnage was con«
structed under the World War II building program e Approxi~
mately 9*$ of our dry cprgo and 57$ of our tanker tonnage is
in the 15 year and older age bracket~~they have long been out»
moded from the standpoint of modern design, are nearly to the
end of their useful life, and are long overdue for replacement [13]
With respect to this nation relying on the shipping of our allies
in time of emergency«»such as the Defense Shipping Authority of NATO,
Admiral Sylvester stated:
It is probable that the total combined shipping requirements of
the NATO nations will exceed the total shipping capabilities
available*
Of utmost signifigance is the fact that the interests of the United
States are global and emergencies may well arise wherein our inter-
ests would not be identical with those of our European allies* [13]
With reference to the last statement quoted above, we have only to
look at the Lebanon crisis to assure ourselves that the flag vessels of
some of our allies would not be welcome in all instances, or review of
the Suez emergency for proof that we cannot depend on foreign shipping-
even that of our allies
In summary of the Soviet threat, the following conclusions ?re
offered:
1. The consequences of the Soviet Union's rapid maritime ex«
pansion program will have serious repercussions on the United States
and the rest of the free world Despite the ultimately adverse
5^

political » military, snc economic consequences, shipyards of our allies
are actively soliciting Soviet shipbuilding orders for short*sighted
proprietary reasons*
2« With Russia making such tremendous progress in maritime strength,
there is no logic justifying the apparent unconcern of our government
toward the steadily diminishing stature and capabilities of the U„ S«
merchant fleet*
3« The national security of the United States and the collective
security of the rest of the free world lies at stake in the maritime






The problems of our merchant marine are not new and although the
interests of this nation are rooted in foreign trade and other maritime
activities, there has been a decided indifference reflected by the public
at large and the government in maintaining an adequate maritime position
The economic advantages which this nation enjoyed in its early days
passed from the maritime scene long ago and with that passing began the
decline of the American Merchant Marine . The main impetus to strengthening
our maritime position has been the result of two world wars and was primar-
ily a security rather than an economic consideration*
Early government assistance to the merchant marine in the form of
cabotage restrictions and ocean mail contracts were ineffective Despite
the great economic contributions which the maritime industries had made
to the growth of the nation, it became apparent that the shipping in-
dustry was no longer economically self-sufficient <> In 1935 » this
condition was recognized as a fact of life and undisguised subsidies
for ship operation and construction were enacted by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 This Act established and clearly stated our policies.
Certain adjustments have been made by legislation to dispose of the
huge war-built fleet and to provide additional long-range assistance
for the modernization of the fleet but, generally, the 1936 Act remains




The fact remains, however, that Uo So policy has failed in the
accomplishment of its stated goalso Except in wartime, the American
Merchant Marine has not come close in carrying 50$ of the foreign
waterborne commerce of the nation -which is generally accepted as the
"substantial portion" called for by the policy statement of the 193&
Act.
The 1936 Act has not only failed in application with respect to
the liner trade in its operating differential subsidies but also by
exclusion of tramp and bulk carriers, has helped foster the contro-
versial "flag of convenience" dilemma . The operating subsidy being
limited by law to liner operations on essential trade waters, has
forced many U. So importers of bulk commodities to own their own
foreign flag ships due to lower operating costs • Likewise, the higher
labor, subsistence and repair costs of the unsubsidized tramp operators
has all but forced them from the high seas« The cost of a U So crew
alone exceeds the charter hire of a fully manned and provisioned
foreign flag tramp in today's market
Obviously, changing the law to include the coverage of bulk and
tramp operators under subsidies is not the logical solution to their
uncompetitive position any more than increasing current subsidies
would make the liner fleets more competitive
The burden to the government and the taxpayer for the cost of
operating subsidies is over two hundred million dollars a yearo Con-
struction subsidies total slightly under a hundred million yearlyo
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The subsidies have, no doubt, kept our fleet in existence but hsve
failed to encourage self-sufficiency in the maritime industry. The
need for subs^dX-gould be markedly reduced through a pjrogram^of







obtains maximum productivity through_efficient use of its capital and
l^bor
Other forms of government assistance such as cargo preference
and other forms of discriminatory practices have not materially affected
the percentage of trade carried in American ships, have not added to
the merchant marine's self-sufficiency and have not enhanced our
shipping relations with other maritime nations u
If subsidies and other forms of government aid have not been
successful, what are the prospects for research and development?
A special committee formed to study the problem stated?
The United States Merchant Marine would directly benefit from a
greatly enlarged program of research and development which both
government and industry should support <> [9]
The logical objectives of such a program should satisfy two basic
considerations of importance:
1, developing a self-supporting U G S„ merchant marine which can
comrete successfully in the world market*
2. developing a U„ S. merchant marine which will be of the
greatest possible use as a "fourth arm of defense* H
In view of the relatively high labor costs in the United States,
the most promising prospect of becoming competitive lies in the new
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technologies of increased mechanization or automation to reduce to
a minimum the nanual labor involved in ship operation and cargo handling o
Requiring subsidized operators to replace their ships with those in-
corporating the fruits of these research efforts is a step forward in
closing the competitive gap« Recognition by the seafaring unions of
the necessity for crew reduction on automated ships is an encouraging
development in the management labor relations area
The successful introduction of technological improvements in
lowering operating costs will reduce subsidy payments in time, but
until our fleet can be made competitive in international trade, they
should be continued o It must be remembered that no single technological
advance, in the face of world competition, can be expected to give us
an advantage for all time Continuing research and development will
be necessary to meet the opponents* challenge*
As has been pointed out, some of our foreign competitors already
have turned to av1 omation and mechanization*. Since they presently
enjoy the advantage of lower operating costs, their need to automate
is not as urgent as our own« However, in view of continuing world
inflation, it is only reasonable to assume they will not neglect
advanced technology as a means to operating efficiencieso
The threat of the growing Soviet maritime strength to the United
States economic and defense posture, points out clearly the inadequacy
of both our present and programmed merchant marine Should a major conflict
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ensue, our country's survival could again depend on the availability
of our ships . In a push-button war these would probably be our least
damaged resource and would be invaluable in evacuation and relocation
effort So
In conclusion, the United States must control sufficient merchant
shipping to strengthen our own economy and that of the free world &n6
also meet the minimum needs of political-economic conflicts Such a
fleet is required
s
1 As a military resource~~a fourth arm of defense v in the event
of armed conflict
2o As a means of exerting economic pressure against the Soviet
threato
3° To insure access to essential raw materialso
ko As a means of protection against exorbitant shipping rates
•
5. To enhance the United States® position as the leader in world
trader
60 To keep open, vital sea lines of communication for promoting
the interchange of both cargoes and mutual understanding between
countries
•
Policies and programs that should be pursued to achieve a viable
ocean transportation system are:
lo A research and development program should be vigorously
prosecuted by the government, coordinated by the Maritime Administration
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with representation by management and labor*, to conduct a study of
scientific, economic and engineering areas to create a Uo S merchant
fleet which can be self supporting without subsidy*
2<> Until technological development.? »nd other innovations ©reduce
a competitive U„ So fleet, the operating subsidies should be continued
.
3 » The advantages of technological changes such as automation and
mechanization must be made apparent to both shipping management and labor,
ij-c The Maritime Administration reserve fleet operation should be
re-examined from a cost effectiveness aspect*
5» The "flags of convenience" ships are a vital asset for emergency
operations and their owners must not be forced by labor or foreign inter~
ests to discontinue their use until Uo So bottoms can be made competitive,,
6 Special attention must be given to labor~management relations
to increase the reliability and stature of our maritime industries
7 » The shipping laws in general, «nd the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 in particular, must be reviewed and updated to promote the adoption
of efficiencies and technological advancements as prerequisites to
government aid
With public interest, government, management and l*bor cooperation,
our ocean transportation system can be made an economical asset, and
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